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The Class Action Suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act:
Current Status, Controversies, and
Suggested Clarifications
By James D. Lipschultz*
Since its enactment in 1967, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act' (ADEA) has posed many problems for the elderly
workers it is designed to protect. One major source of these
problems2 is section 626(b) s of the ADEA, which adopts the "opt-
in" class action of the Fair Labor Standards Act4 (FLSA). As a
result of this incorporation, Rule 235 class action suits generally are
not available to elderly workers alleging violations of the ADEA,
despite the availability of Rule 23 class actions in other employ-
ment discrimination suits.6 Such class actions are available to eld-
erly workers only when the federal government is the defendant,
and not when the alleged violator is a private employer. The rea-
sons for adopting different procedural measures in cases involving
claims of age discrimination or for distinguishing between private
* B.A., 1979, University of California, Los Angeles. Member, Second Year Class.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. MII 1979).
2. Other procedural difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the ADEA, such as
giving notice of intent to sue to the Secretary of Labor, invoking the proper statute of limi-
tations, and the availability of liquidated damages, are beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally Sheeder, Procedural Complexity of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
An Age-Old Problem, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 241 (1980); Note, The Procedural Requirements of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 9 Rur.-Cm. L.J. 540 (1978); Note,
Procedural Aspects of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. Prrr. L.
Rav. 914 (1975).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
5. Fin. R. Civ. P. 23.
6. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Romasanta v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915 (7th Cir.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 385 (1976).
7. The only distinction between age discrimination and the types of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII that is contained in the legislative history of the ADEA is found in
the Hearings before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor on H.R. 8651, H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967). The
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and federal government defendants are not clear.
This Note analyzes the application of the FLSA class action
device to suits against private employers based on claims of age
discrimination. The Note first examines the substance and applica-
tion of the current statutory provisions, and then surveys the his-
tory underlying the "opt-in" requirement to illustrate how its
adoption has frustrated the enforcement of the ADEA. The Note
also examines current judicial conflicts regarding notice and solici-
tation under the FLSA class action and suggests approaches to
resolving these issues which could increase the effectiveness of the
Act.
hearings resulted in H.R. 13,054, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), which, combined with S. 830,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), formed the basis for the ADEA. At the hearings, Representa-
tive James Burke of Massachusetts stated: "Age discrimination is not the same as the insidi-
ous discrimination based on race or creed prejudices or bigotry. Racial or religious discrimi-
nation results in nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his
ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job seeker." Hearings before the
General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Cemm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 3651,
H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1967). It is not readily apparent why
Representative Burke did not believe that such attitudes were not a problem for the elderly
job seeker. Any illegal discrimination in employment implies that an employer based hiring
and firing decisions on factors unrelated to the worker's ability to do a particular job.
A more accurate distinction between age discrimination and the types of discrimination
prohibited under Title VII has been identified by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals: "Age
concededly differs from the Title VII classifications in that, for some jobs, statistically sig-
nificant correlations might demonstrate that persons above certain middle ages are inher-
ently disabled from performing as satisfactorily as their younger counterparts." Rodriguez v.
Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1977). The court in Rodriguez added that Congress
recognized this distinction and provided employers with the "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation" defenses of § 623(f) to a charge of age discrimination. Id. at 1237. The implication of
allowing such a defense is that firings and nonhirings based on age are more likely to be
justifiable than those based on race, sex, or religion.
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee, Representative John H. Dent of Penn-
sylvania, stated: "[T]his member of this committee does not want this legislation to be
combined with any of the existing anti-discrimination programs which are of a different
nature. I don't want it confused with any other kind of discrimination. It is distinct and
separate discrimination and should be recognized as such." Hearings before the General
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768,
and H.R. 4221, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1967). Unfortunately, Representative Dent does not
state why age discrimination is distinct from other types of discrimination nor if the distinc-
tion implies that different enforcement procedures should be used.
It is doubtful that the Third Circuit's distinction between age discrimination and Title
VII discrimination makes the Rule 23 device any less effective or desirable for the ADEA.
Because Rule 23 presently may be used in ADEA suits against the federal government, one
could conclude that the distinction is irrelevant. Cf. Naton v. Bank of CaL, 72 F.R.D. 550,
555 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (prior to 1978 amendments to the ADEA).
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The Current Statutory Scheme
The stated purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employ-
ers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment."8 To accomplish these goals, the
ADEA sets forth sweeping prohibitions covering age discrimination
practices by employers, employment agencies, and labor organiza-
tions." Since 1974, these prohibitions have been extended to age
discrimination in most branches of the federal government.10 De-
rived principally from the substantive prohibitions"' of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),12 the prohibitions are in-
tended to remove age as a consideration in employment, except
when it "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of the particular business. ' ' s
Although the substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were de-
rived from Title VII, the enforcement procedures" were, with only
minor exceptions, adopted from and patterned after those of the
FLSA. Both the ADEA and the FLSA establish two mechanisms
for enforcement: actions by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission1 5 (EEOC) and private actions by the aggrieved work-
ers.' e Before bringing any private action, an individual must file a
charge with the EEOC alleging unlawful discrimination.' The Sec-
retary then must seek to eliminate the unlawful practice through
8. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
9. Id. § 623 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
10. Id. § 633a.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to (e) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
12. Id. § 2000e to 2000e-17. The United States Supreme Court, in Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575 (1978), stated: "IT]he prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba
from Title VII." Id. at 584.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976). This subsection also exempts: (1) bona fide seniority
systems and employee benefit plans that are not subterfuges to evade the Act, (2) any prac-
tice where the differentiation is reasonably based on factors other than age, and (3) any
discharge or discipline of an individual for good cause from the proscriptions of the Act. Id.
§ 623(f)(2).
14. See id. § 626(b)-(e) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
15. Id. § 626(d). In 1978 all functions of the Secretary of Labor were transferred to the
EEOC. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 2, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., at
354 (Supp. 11 1979) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1970).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (Supp. 1I 1979).
17. Id. § 626(d). This subsection also provides that the charge must be filed "within
180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." Id. § 626(d)(1).
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informal methods,18 and if unsuccessful, may bring suit to enforce
the employee's rights.19 The employee may bring a private action
only if: (1) after sixty days from the filing of a charge, the EEOC is
unsuccessful in reaching an agreement with the employer through
informal methods;20 and (2) the EEOC fails to bring an action on
behalf of the employee.2 1
In specifying procedural requirements for private actions
brought under the ADEA, the Act expressly adopts certain en-
forcement procedures of the FLSA,2 2 including the class action
procedure contained in section 216(b).2 Section 216(b) creates a
statutory class action with only two requirements: aggrieved em-
ployees must be "similarly situated"24 and the employees must file
written consent with the court to become party. plaintiffs. 5 The
latter requirement establishes an "opt-in" procedure in which each
person must take positive action to become a member of the
class. 6
18. Id. § 626(d).
19. Id. § 626(c)(1).
20. Id. § 626(d).
21. Id. § 626(c)(1).
22. Id. § 626(b) (1976). This subsection incorporates §3 211(b), 216 (except for subsec-
tion (a)), and 217 of the FLSA. Id.
23. Id. § 216(b) (Supp. 1I 1979).
24. Id. See, e.g., Riojas v. Seal Prod., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Courts
have been quite reluctant to define "similarly situated." The court in Burgett v. Cudahy
Co., 361 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1973), however, listed five factors that led it to conclude that
the plaintiffs were "similarly situated" within the meaning of § 216(b). They were all (1)
between the ages of 60 and 65; (2) longtime supervisory personnel for the employer, (3)
fired and rehired by the employer at the same time and for apparently the same reasons; (4)
complaining of the same discriminatory behavior and concomitant injury, and (5) seeking
the same affirmative relief. Id. at 622. Because there were only four plaintiffs in Burgett, it
is reasonable to conclude that in an action involving a larger number of plaintiffs,* a court
would not require the presence of all five of these factors in order to find that the plaintiffs
were similarly situated.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1II 1979). This subsection provides: "An action to re-
cover the liability prescribed ... may be maintained against any employer.., by any one
or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his con-
sent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action'is brought." These requirements differ significantly from those of Rule 23. See note
88 infra.
26. See, e.g., EEOC v. Gilbarco, Inc., 615 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1980); Kinney Shoe Corp.
v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.
1975); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975); Moysey v. Andrus,
481 F. Supp. 852 (D.D.C. 1979); Groshek v. Babcock & Wilcox Tubular Prod. Div., 425 F.
Supp. 232 (D. Wis. 1977); Pandis v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Corp.,
431 F. Supp. 793 (D. Conn. 1977); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa.
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The "opt-in" requirement of section 216(b) is applicable to all
FLSA actions and, under section 626(b), to ADEA actions against
private employers. Unlike the FLSA, however, the ADEA has a
special provision for suits against the federal government.2 7 En-
forcement procedures for these suits are set forth in a separate
provision" and are independent of the other enforcement provi-
sions of the ADEA.2 9 As construed, ADEA class actions against the
federal government are not bound by the "opt-in" requirement
adopted by section 626(b).10
Employee class actions are particularly effective in carrying
out the Act's prohibitions against age discrimination. The affirma-
tive defenses allowed under the ADEA enable an employer to es-
cape liability by showing either that age is a qualification reasona-
bly necessary for performance of the job or that the decision to fire
or not hire was based on reasonable factors other than age.3 1 Under
these defenses, the burden on an employer to present evidence
that an individual was reasonably discharged or disciplined would
be much less than would the burden to show that numerous em-
ployees had been terminated with proper cause. It thus is more
difficult to prove a case of individual, as opposed to class, discrimi-
nation. In addition, class action plaintiffs can more effectively use
statistical evidence to prove age discrimination than can individual
plaintiffs for whom such evidence may not be available.32
1975); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd per curiam, 453 F.2d
1259 (6th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
28. Id. § 633a(b).
29. Id. § 633a(f). Section 633a(f) states that any action brought under § 633a "shall
not be subject to, or affected by, any other provision of the [ADEA]," except the age limita-
tion of § 631(b). Prior to the addition of this subsection in 1978, the other enforcement
sections of the ADEA were not expressly excluded from use in conjunction with § 633a.
Section 633a was enforced in an inconsistent manner. The court in Carter v. Marshall, 457
F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1978), applied the "opt-in" requirement, holding that § 633a could be
enforced concurrently with the procedures of § 626. Another court, Bradley v. Kissinger, 418
F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1976), suggested that § 633a was independent of § 626 and allowed
consideration of a Rule 23 class action against the federal government.
30. Moysey v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. 1979), is the only case to date inter-
preting § 633a(f). The Moysey court justified its holding by stating that a contrary result
would render an action against the federal government subject to the requirements of a
separate ADEA provision. This would be in direct conflict with § 633(a). Id. at 853.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976).
32. For an examination of the use of statistical evidence in age discrimination suits,
see Note, Statistics as Evidence of Age Discrimination, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 1347 (1981). For
an examination of the use of statistical evidence in Title'VII suits, see Braun, Statistics and
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Class actions have proved to be an invaluable device in the
enforcement of the discrimination prohibitions of Title VIL.ss As
with race and sex discrimination, age discrimination is by defini-
tion class discrimination. 4 Requiring each individual employee to
file separate, identical charges with the EEOC against the same
employer would tend to impede the enforcement of these prohibi-
tions.35 Moreover, the general advantages of class actions-
avoiding multiplicity of suits, 8 and more importantly, allowing the
prosecution of claims that otherwise might be economically infeasi-
ble 7-help effectuate the goals of the ADEA, and provide the most
efficient adjudication of the rights of elderly workers.
Notwithstanding the desirability of allowing class actions in
age discrimination suits, a fundamental difference between the
Rule 23 class action and the statutory class action prescribed
under the ADEA has severely limited the use of the ADEA class
action device against private employers. While the Rule 23 class
action procedure allows passive binding of class members, 8 the
ADEA representative suit places an affirmative procedural burden
of "opting-in" on each potential class member.
The three types of class actions allowed by Rule 23 are each
inconsistent with the section 216(b) class action because each al-
lows a person to be bound as a class member without taking any
affirmative action. In Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) actions, the
court determines and describes in the judgment which individuals
are members of the class.3 9 The opportunity for individuals to in-
the Law: Hypothesis Testing and its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HAsTINGs L.J. 59
(1980).
33. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
34. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between age discrimination and
other forms of discrimination, see note 7 supra.
35. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
36. See generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Avis Rent
A Car System, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1093 (N.D. I1. 1976);
Richardson v. Fargo, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 3B J. MooRx, FEDERAL PRAc-
TicE 23.02[1] (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
37. See, e.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. RE V. 684 (1941). See also note 92 infra.
38. For an examination of the advantages of a Rule 23 class action as compared with
the § 216(b) class action, see notes 88-92 & accompanying text infra.
39. Rule 23(c)(3) provides in part: "The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include




clude or exclude themselves, although available under section
216(b), is not possible in a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) action. In
a Rule 23(b)(3) action, on the other hand, potential class members
are notified of the pendency of the action and given an opportunity
to "opt-out" of the class.'0 In contrast to a section 216(b) suit, a
person who fails to opt-out of a Rule 23(b)(3) action remains a
member of the class and is bound by the judgment.41
Judicial Interpretation of Section 216(b) in Light
of Rule 23
Despite Congress' express incorporation of the FLSA class ac-
tion device into the ADEA, arguments have been advanced to al-
low Rule 23 class actions in ADEA suits. However, only two Rule
23 suits against private employers have been allowed by the courts.
In Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, Inc.,'2 the court certified a Rule 23
class action, reasoning that Rule 23 and section 216(b) are not fun-
damentally irreconcilable. The action was certified under Rule 23
after all the plaintiffs had filed their consents with the court in
conformity with section 216(b).4s The plaintiffs were then allowed
to proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3) class."
The procedure allowed in Bishop is not in conformity with the
requirements of Rule 23. Notice was not provided to potential
40. Rule 23(c)(2) states: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court wil exclude him from the
class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not re-.
quest exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel." Id. 23(c)(2).
Because the ielationship between potential plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is more
tenuous than in a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) class action, due process considerations
require the court to direct notice to all persons defined as members of the class. See, e.g.,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
41. The second sentence of Rule 23(c)(3) states: "The judgment in an action main-
tained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of
the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
42. 5 EmpL Prac. Dec. 6657 (D.D.C. 1972).
43. Id. at 6659.
44. Id. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b)(3) authorizes class actions in circumstances where the
claims involve common questions of law or fact. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
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plaintiffs who had not filed consent,45 thereby failing to satisfy the
mandatory notice requirement of Rule 23(c)(2). Moreover, mem-
bers of the class were not given an opportunity to "opt-out"-a
prerequisite to maintaining a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The dis-
trict court's finding that Rule 23 and section 216(b) are not funda-
mentally irreconcilable has never been supported by an appellate
court and is contrary to the findings of five circuit courts of
appeals.46
The court in Blankenship v. Ralston Purina Co.47 reasoned
that, because the substantive procedures of the ADEA are nearly
identical to those of Title VII, 4s procedural devices used in Title
VII actions should be allowed in ADEA actions.49 Because Rule 23
class actions are liberally allowed in discrimination suits under Ti-
tle VII,50 the court found that such class actions should also be
allowed under the ADEA. The court stated that a strict interpreta-
tion of section 216(b) would unduly restrict enforcement of the
ADEA and thus contravene congressional intent.51 While implicitly
recognizing Rule 23 and section 216(b) as mutually exclusive, the
court failed to confront Congress' explicit preference for FLSA en-
forcement procedures.
In 1975, the Fifth Circuit decided what has become the lead-
ing case on this conflict, LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,5
which rejected the position adopted by Bishop and Blankenship
and held that Rule 23 could not be used to circumvent the unam-
biguous "opt-in" requirement of section 216(b).58 The court stated:
"There is a fundamental, irreconcilable difference between the
class action described by Rule 23 and that provided for by [section
45. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had evidence of discrimination against
approximately 100 additional employees that would fall into the class who had not filed
consents. 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 6659.
46. See note 55 infra.
47. 62 F.R.D. 35 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
48. See note 12 supra.
49. The court based its holding on its interpretation of the policy underlying the law:
"Since Congress clearly defined its policy as remedial with respect to such social problems,
the courts have generally looked to the Congressional intent behind the law rather than to
procedural restrictions which might impair the law's effectiveness.... The federal courts
in particular have recognized that the Rule 23 class action is particularly adaptable to situa-
tions involving discrimination." 62 F.R.D. at 38.
50. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
51. 62 F.R.D. at 38; "
52. 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
53. 513 F.2d at 289. See note 56 & accompanying text infra.
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216(b)]." 54 Although a number of plaintiffs have continued to as-
sert the contrary, thereby demonstrating a desire that the Rule 23
class action be available in age discrimination suits, every court of
appeals ruling on this issue has held the section 216(b) and Rule 23
class actions to be mutually exclusive. 5 Since 1975, courts have
unanimously held that ADEA actions against private defendants
must be enforced through section 216(b) and cannot be maintained
as a class action under Rule 23.1e These courts have noted that
Congress was well aware of Rule 23 at the time the ADEA was
adopted 57 and have held that if Congress had wished to permit the
Rule 23 enforcement technique for the ADEA, it would not have
explicitly stated that the Act was to be enforced in accordance
with the provisions of the FLSA. 58
Despite virtual unanimity on the part of the courts in finding
Rule 23 and section 216(b) procedures mutually exclusive, parties
continued to argue that the similarities between Title VII and the
ADEA were relevant to show congressional intent that Title VII
and the ADEA be enforced by similar procedures. 59 These argu-
ments appear to have been put to rest in 1978 by the United
States Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons.60
54. Id. at 288.
55. See EEOC v. Gilbarco, 615 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1980); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes,
564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977); Schmidt v. Fuller Brush Co., 527 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1975);
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co.,
453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
56. McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v.
Gilbarco, 615 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1980); Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.
1977); Doctor v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 540 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1976); Moysey v. Andrus,
481 F. Supp. 850 (D.D.C. 1979); Carter v. Marshall, 457 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1978); Cava-
naugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Pandis v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Corp., 431 F. Supp. 793 (D. Conn. 1977); Bradley v.
Kissinger, 418 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1976); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc.,
76 F.R.D. 23 (D.N.C. 1977); Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 76 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.C. 1976); Naton v.
Bank of Cal., 72 F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Cooke v. Reynolds Metals Co., 65 F.R.D. 539
(D. Va. 1975).
57. See McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
58. Id. at 911.
59. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex.
1977); Locascio v. Teletype Corp., 74 F.R.D. 108 (N.D. IMI. 1977); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 72
F.R.D. 550 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
60. 434 U.S. 575 (1978). The issue before the court in Lorillard was whether there is a
right to a jury trial in private civil actions under the ADEA The ADEA contains no provi-
sion expressly granting or denying a right to a jury trial, but because § 626(b) states that the
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The Court in Lorillard recognized the similarities between the
ADEA and Title VII, but rejected the analogies to Title VII by
explicitly stating that reliance on these similarities to find a con-
gressional intent that both Acts be enforced under like procedures
was misplaced.61 The Court reasoned that significant differences in
the remedial and procedural provisions of the two laws required
this conclusion.62 Moreover, the Court stated that Congress' failure
to adopt Title VII enforcement procedures while using its substan-
tive prohibitions indicates a desire to avoid Title VII procedures in
enforcing the ADEA.63
The Court in Lorillard also emphasized that Congress' careful
selection of certain procedures of the FLSA and departure from
others" suggests that, except for these departures, Congress "in-
ADEA is to be enforced with the procedures of the FLSA, the respondent claimed that the
well-established FLSA policy of allowing jury trials in private civil actions should be fol-
lowed. The petitioner claimed-as did the plaintiff in Blankenship, see notes 85, 86 & ac-
companying text infra-that a contrary congressional intent is found in the fact that Title
VII does not allow jury trials in enforcing the substantive provisions identical to those set
forth in the ADEA.
61. 434 U.S. at 585.
62. The Court set forth two distinctions between the ADEA and Title VII. First, Con-
gress specifically authorized the courts to grant "legal relief" under the ADEA, but did not
specifically authorize the availability of such relief under Title VII. Second, the ADEA pro-
vides that employers "shall be liable" for amounts deemed to be owed, while the availability
of back pay under Title VII is a matter of discretion for the court. Id. at 584.
63. "Indeed, to the extent petitioner correctly interprets congressional intent with re-
spect to jury trials under Title VII, the very different remedial and procedural provisions of
the ADEA suggest that Congress had a very different intent in mind in drafting the later
law." Id. at 585 n.14.
64. The Court set forth three examples of enforcement procedures in the FLSA that
were not adopted by the ADEA. First, the ADEA explicitly allows that equitable relief may
be appropriate in any action brought under the ADEA, both in private actions and those
brought by the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). On the other
hand, Lorillard noted that the lower federal courts consistently have construed the FLSA to
allow equitable relief only in actions brought by the Secretary of Labor. 434 U.S. at 581
(citing Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d- 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Roberg v. Henry
Phipps Estate, 156 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946); Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., 137 F.2d 37 (3d
Cir. 1943)).
Second, the Court noted that the ADEA did not adopt the FLSA provision on liqui-
dated damages, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976), while incorporating §§ 255 and 259. These latter
provisions, it was noted, were added to the FLSA by the same act that added the liquidated
damages provision to the FLSA. See Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1976)). Liquidated damages may only be awarded under the ADEA
when the violation is willful. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Under the FLSA, however, the court
can limit or deny liquidated damages if an employer demonstrates that he or she acted in
good faith and reasonably believed he or she was not violating the FLSA. Id. § 260.
Third, Congress expressly declined to incorporate the FLSA criminal sanctions, id. §
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tended to incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of the
FLSA. ' 6 5 Lorillard expressly recognized that when "Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law,... [it] can
be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to
the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new stat-
ute."66 The Court thus presumed that Congress was aware of the
effect that judicial interpretation of the FLSA would have on the
enforcement of the ADEA.
Lorillard may be distinguishable from the question of whether
Rule 23 class actions are available in actions brought under the
ADEA. In determining whether the right to jury trial was available
in ADEA actions, the Court in Lorillard noted that section 626(b)
of the ADEA empowers a court to grant "legal or equitable relief,"
and section 626(c) authorizes individuals to bring actions for "legal
or equitable relief.167 In cases in which legal relief is available and
legal rights are determined, the seventh amendment provides a
right to a jury trial.6 8 The implication of the right to jury trial in
Lorillard most certainly comports with the broad, liberal, remedial
goals of the ADEA; extending the rationale of Lorillard to the is-
sue of the availability of Rule 23 class actions under the ADEA has
the effect of denying this useful remedial device to plaintiffs.
Despite these distinctions and the different policy considera-
tions relevant to class actions and the right to a jury trial, it is
probable that the Lorillard rationale will preclude judicial imple-
mentation of Rule 23 class actions in ADEA suits against private
defendants. Rather, age discrimination suits against private defen-
dants must use the statutory class action created by section 216(b).
Only in age discrimination suits brought against the federal gov-
ernment, and in discrimination suits brought under Title VII, may
the Rule 23 class action device be used.69
216(a), into the ADEA. Cf. id. § 629 (sanctions available for violations of ADEA). 434 U.S.
at 581-82.
65. 434 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 581. The Court added: "That presumption is particularly appropriate here
since, in enacting the ADEA, Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA
provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions
regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation." Id.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)-(c) (1976).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VII 434 U.S. at 583. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-
96 (1974).
69. This has been clearly demonstrated in cases alleging violations of Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). As a part of the FLSA, the
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Development of the "Opt-in" Requirement
Prohibiting Rule 23 class actions in ADEA suits against pri-
vate employers is particularly incongruous when considered in
light of the legislative and judicial history establishing the "opt-in"
requirement under'the FLSA.70 When enacted in 1938 to impose
minimum wage and maximum hour limitations on employers 7 1
section 216(b) of the FLSA specifically authorized the use of class
actions and agent or representative actions. 2 The class action was
construed to be a spurious class action"3 under former Rule 23.
The rationale underlying the acceptance of the spurious class ac-
tion was that judicial economy would be achieved by allowing per-
sons interested in a common question of law or fact to consolidate
Equal Pay Act is enforced by the FLSA procedures, including the "opt-in" class action. See
id. § 206(d)(3). In these cases, the Title VII cause of action can be enforced under Rule 23,
while the Equal Pay cause of action must proceed separately as a § 216(b) class action. See,
e.g., Rawson v. Ducommun Metals Co., [1980] EMPL. PRAc. GumE (CCH) 131,206 (C.D. Cal.
1980); Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,919 (D. Md. 1979); Paddison v.
Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (D. Pa. 1973); Maguire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 55 F.R.D.
48 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
70. See notes 42-51 & accompanying text supra. Compare notes 8-13 & accompanying
text supra (remedial purposes of the ADEA) with notes 78-80 & accompanying text infra
(discussion of curtailing FLSA suits).
71. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976) (congressional findings and declarations of
policy); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
72. As originally enacted in 1938, § 216(b) authorized two forms of suits: "Action to
recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one
or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to main-
tain such action for or in behalf of all employees similarly situated." 52 Stat. 1060, 1069
(1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. I 1979)). The first clause
created the class action; the second clause created the agent or representative action. See
MooRE, supra note 33, app. 1 23.10[4].
73. Although courts were divided on the precise construction and label to be given to §
216(b) in light of former Rule 23, all of the courts addressing the issue considered it a form
of permissive joinder. Some courts refused to call a § 216(b) action a class suit and treated it
as a mere joinder device. See, e.g., Lofther v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 45 F. Supp. 986
(N.D. IlM. 1941); Saxton v. W.S. Askew Co., 35 F. Supp. 519 (N.D. Ga. 1940). Most courts
labeled a § 216(b) suit as a spurious class action but treated it as a permissive joinder de-
vice. See, e.g., Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Sinclair v. United
States Gypsum Co., 75 F. Supp. 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1948); Schempf v. Armour & Co., 5 F.R.D.
294 (D. Minn. 1946).
74. Prior to the 1966 amendments, Rule 23(a) set out three types of class actions: (1)
the so-called "true" class action involving "joint, common, or secondary rights"; (2) the "hy-
brid" class action involving "several" rights relating to "specific property"; and (3) the
"spurious" class action involving "several" rights affected by a common question and related
to common relief. See 39 F.R.D. 69, 94-107 (1966).
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their claims into a single suit.7 5 Section 216(b) was not intended to
create a true class action under old Rule 23;71 such an interpreta-
tion would have dictated that every co-worker be estopped by the
judgment if he or she brought a separate action against the
employer.7
In 1947, section 216(b) was amended to delete the clause au-
thorizing agent or representative actions and to include the re-
quirement of filing consent with the court to become a plaintiff.78
The congressional intent underlying this amendment is clear. The
amendment was enacted to curtail the proliferation of suits
brought against employers under the substantive prohibitions of
the FLSA.79 Requiring plaintiffs to file consent with the court fur-
thered this goal by preventing unnamed, similarly situated em-
ployees from asserting surprise claims against employers.80
Significantly, this amendment had little effect on the class ac-
tion suit as it existed under former Rule 23 prior to 1947. Because
the judgment in a spurious class action bound only parties to the
action, the requirement of filing consent with the court did not
limit or extend the binding effect of the judgment. Rather, it only
made the action more difficult to initiate by requiring each plain-
tiff to file consent personally with the court instead of merely au-
thorizing the existing plaintiffs to proceed in the action. The spuri-
75. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1945); Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co.,
125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941); Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1940); MOORE, supra note 36, app. 23.10[1].
76. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).
77. Id.
78. The amendment deleted from § 216(b) the phrase, "or such employee or employ-
ees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all
employees similarly situated," and added in its place the phrase, "[n]o employee shall be a
party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a
party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." Portal-to-
Portal Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 87 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. I1 1979)).
79. In 1946, the United States Supreme Court, in Andersen v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), substantially broadened the definition of "working time" for pur-
poses of the FLSA. The decision in Andersen dramatically increased employers' potential
liability to their employees under the FLSA. Congress, alarmed that this posed a serious
threat to the national economy and the principles of collective bargaining, determined that
legislation to counteract this decision was essential. See HousE COMM. ON THE JUDmcIRY,
H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1029, 1034.
80. See Gibbons v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 173 F.2d 337 (2d
Cir. 1949); Deley v. Atlantic Box & Lumber Corp., 119 F. Supp. 727 (D.N.J. 1954).
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ous class action of Rule 23 was not precluded by this amendment
and was still used to enforce the FLSA.81 However, the require-
ment of filing consent, combined with employee reluctance to ap-
pear to be initiating an action against his or her employer, resulted
in very few section 216(b) class actions.82
The critical clause of section 216(b) was not characterized as
establishing an "opt-in" requirement until Rule 23 was amended in
1966 to establish the conflicting "opt-out" class action.83 The com-
ments to the 1966 amendment specifically state that the "opt-in"
class action of the FLSA was not to be altered,8 indicating explicit
congressional recognition that the spurious class action, inconsis-
tent with and not included in new Rule 23, was still to be used to
enforce the FLSA.85
Congress was similarly explicit in choosing the enforcement
procedures of the FLSA for the ADEA when it was enacted in
1967.8 However, the reasons for continued use of the spurious
class action in FLSA suits appear wholly inapplicable to enforce-
ment of ADEA provisions. There is no evidence in the legislative
history of the ADEA that Congress desired to limit available reme-
dies to victims of age discrimination or even considered the advan-
tages of the recently amended Rule 23.87 Nonetheless, the ADEA
unambiguously adopts the enforcement procedures of section
216(b), including the "opt-in" class action.
The Power of the Court to Provide Notice to Potential
Plaintiffs
A comparison between the statutory class action of section
216(b) and the Rule 23 class action reveals that the "opt-in" re-
81. See MooRs, supra note 36, app. 1 23.10[4]. In addition, § 7 of the Portal-to-Portal
Pay Act expressly recognized that future class actions may be instituted. 6.1 Stat. 84, 88
(1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 256 (1976)).
82. See EEOC v. Gilbarco, 615 F.2d 985, 998-99 (4th Cir. 1980) (Murnaghan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See notes 39-41 & accompanying text supra.
84. "The present provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are not intended to be affected by
Rule 23, as amended." 39 F.R.D. 73, 104 (1966).
85. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977).
86. Senator Javits stated: "The enforcement techniques provided by [the ADEA] are
directly analogous to those available under the [FLSA]; in fact, [the ADEA] incorporates by
reference, to the greatest extent possible, the provisions of the [FLSA]." 113 CONG. Rxc.
31,254 (1967).
87. See notes 88-91 & accompanying text infra.
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quirement of section 216(b) potentially restricts the enforcement
of the ADEA. The initial requirements to maintain a Rule 23 class
action"" impose limitations not present in a section 216(b) class ac-
tion. 9 One major advantage of a Rule 23 action, 0 however, is that
it explicitly allows notice to be given to potential plaintiffs.9 1 In
contrast, the ADEA contains no notice provision. The lack of a no-
tice provision under the ADEA is critical. If notice is not given to
potential plaintiffs under section 216(b), age discrimination suits
against private employers are severely limited. Many individuals
with meritorious claims might be unaware of the existence of an
action in which their claims could be adjudicated. Moreover, those
individuals with small claims may be precluded from asserting
their claims because they believe it is not worth the time and ex-
pense to bring an action for a small amount, or more frequently,
because many attorneys are not willing to handle such cases for
88. Rule 23 sets forth four requirements to maintain a class action: "(1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
89. See note 19 supra.
90. There are other disadvantages of a § 216(b) action, which, while they do not pose
as fundamental a problem as the failure to provide notice, do pose minor obstacles for
ADEA plaintiffs. As discussed earlier, § 626(d) requires a plaintiff to file a charge alleging
unlawful discrimination with the Secretary of Labor within a specified period following the
date the alleged practice occurred-180 to 300 days depending on the violation. See note 17
& accompanying text supra. No such requirement exists for a Rule 23 action. Assuming a
plaintiff meets these requirements, he or she still can represent only those individuals who
could have complied with the notice requirements themselves. Cavanaugh v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1977). Additionally, most courts have set
time limits for potential plaintiffs to fie their consents, thus imposing another barrier for
those who wish to join the suit. See, e.g., Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 83 F.R.D.
150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (established limit of 90 days from filing the order implementing
the decision); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 72 F.R.D. 550, 556 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (30 days from date
of court order).
91. Rule 23 contains two notice provisions. The mandatory notice requirement of sub-
division (c)(2) provides: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
Fo R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Subsection (d) provides for optional notice in any Rule 23 class
action, at the court's discretion: "[t]he court may make appropriate orders: ... (2) requir-
ing, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the
members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the
opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and ade-




There is presently a conflict concerning whether notice to po-
tential plaintiffs is allowed under section 216(b). The federal
courts passing on this issue have adopted one of two approaches.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court can only order or
allow notice when necessary to protect due process interests9 3 The
Second Circuit, on the other hand, allows notice to potential plain-
tiffs to be given in "proper cases.""H
Courts adopting the due process theory reason that, because
section 216(b) does not expressly grant the plaintiff a right to no-
tify potential plaintiffs of the pendency of the action, notice can
only be sent when due process requires it. Potential plaintiffs who
do not "opt-in" are not bound by the judgment in a section 216(b)
action and cannot be adversely affected. Therefore, no due process
interests are violated by failure to provide notice.95 Although this
approach recognizes that giving notice alerts potential class mem-
bers to their potential claims, it maintains that alerting potential
class members is not an interest that notice is designed to
further.98
The Second Circuit has expressly rejected the due process the-
ory of the Ninth Circuit,9 holding that even though due process
does not require notice, a district court has the power to order no-
tice in a proper case.98 The court stressed that its holding com-
92. In his dissent in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), Justice Douglas
concluded: "The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against
those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with the view of creating a
system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as to those liberally endowed with
power and wealth." Id. at 186 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977).
94. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
95. See, e.g., Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977); Roshto v.
Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. La. 1975).
96. Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (E.D. La. 1975). See also Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The comments to the 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that the various notice provisions of Rule 23 are
designed to comply with the requirements of due process. 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1976). Signifi-
cantly, however, the comments do not attempt to limit the potential effects notice may
have, beyond stating that notice in a Rule 23 class action should not be given merely to
allow solicitation of claims. Id.
97. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
98. Id. at 336. See Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 2188
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 7, 1981); Soler v. G & U Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Riojas
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ported with both the interest of avoiding multiplicity of suits and
the broad remedial purposes of the Act.99
Unfortunately, the courts adopting this approach have pro-
vided little guidance in defining a "proper case." The courts that
have attempted to elaborate on what constitutes a proper case
have allowed notice based on one of two factors: whether notice is
required by principles of fundamental fairness and whether the
four requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied.
When allowing notice based on principles of fundamental fair-
ness, courts have advocated an ad hoc determination of whether
the particular facts constitute a proper case.Such a determination
is left entirely to the discretion of the trial court.1 °0 The critical
inquiry in this approach has been whether, absent notice, the po-
tential plaintiffs possess meaningful access to the courts. 10 1
The second rationale for allowing notice differs markedly from
the fundamental fairness test. Rather than relying on the highly
discretionary concept of "fairness," courts using the second ap-
proach would allow notice when the requirements of Rule 23(a) are
met.102 Unfortunately, the only court to apply this test did not
v. Seal Prod., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Geller v. Markham, 19 F.E.P. Cas.
1622 (D. Conn. 1979); Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, 21 Fed. Prac. Dec. 12,919 (D. Md. 1979).
In Joyce v. Sandia Laboratories, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,043A (N.D. Cal. 1980), the court
expressed a preference for this rationale but found itself bound by its own circuit's holding
in Kinney. In Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the
court denied notice by stating it was "inappropriate." On motion for reargument, the court
recognized that although it had the authority to order notice, its denial was an exercise of its
discretion. Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., No. 78 Civ. 4828 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 3,
1980).
99. 600 F.2d at 336. In Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 2188
(S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 7, 1981), "the court stated that "the notice machinery contemplated by
the ADEA, by reaching out to potential plaintiffs, may further the statute's remedial
purpose."
100. See Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. 12,919 (D. Md. 1979).
101. In Riojas v. Seal Prod., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1979), the plaintiffs,
agricultural field laborers, alleged violations of the FLSA minimum wage provisions. The
plaintiffs attached to the complaint a consent form signed by 65 individuals and sought the
court to authorize the Texas Rural Legal Aid, plaintiffs' counsel, to send notice to other
potential plaintiffs to allow them to file their consents. The court, citing Braunstein, held
that § 216(b) would authorize the giving of notice to potential class members. Id. at 619.
The court emphasized that under these particular facts-where the potential plaintiffs are
poor, difficult to locate, and have little education-allowing notice is nothing more than an
act of fundamental fairness. In Geller v. Markham, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 1622 (D. Conn. 1979), the
court was even more lenient. Part of the basis for allowing notice in Geller was a mere
showing that there was no evidence that the potential plaintiffs were aware of the pending
action. Id. at 1623.
102. See Geller v. Markham, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 1622 (D. Conn. 1979).
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state why meeting these requirements makes the case proper to
provide notice.10 3
From a comparison with the precertification stage in Rule 23
class actions and an analysis of other Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, it appears that the approach of the Second Circuit is prefera-
ble to the more restrictive approach of the Ninth Circuit. By only
allowing notice when mandated by due process, the Ninth Circuit
is ignoring other provisions in the Federal Rules. As in the section
216(b) class action, Rule 23 does not grant an express right to no-
tify potential plaintiffs of the pendency of an action in the precer-
tification stage. However, subsection (d)(2) of Rule 23 grants the
court discretion to provide notice at any step in the action, 0 4 in-
cluding the precertification stage, regardless of whether due pro-
cess required notice at that time. 05 The comments to Rule 23 state
that this notice should not be used for the mere undesirable solici-
tation of claims, but is intended for the "fair conduct of the ac-
tion."10 Notice given in a Rule 23 action prior to certification, and
in a section 216(b) action, would not only notify potential plaintiffs
of a chance to litigate their claims, but would more efficiently adju-
dicate the rights of existing parties,0 7 avoid a multiplicity of suits,
and provide fairness to all persons with claims against the
103. The Geller court merely stated that meeting the Rule 23(a) requirements makes
it a proper case. Id. at 1623. The court did not state how it applied the requirements to the
facts; the" court only stated that the requirements were satisfied.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). The comments to Rule 23 provide a nonexhaustive list of
occasions on which the court, in its discretion, can require that notice be sent. In "limited
fund" cases, members have been notified to present individual claims subsequent to the
class certification. Notice has also gone to class members so they can express opposition to
the representation. See United States v. American Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill.
1951). Notice may also be used to encourage interventions to improve the representation of
the class. Cf. Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944) (stricter rule as
to adequacy of representation ought to apply where judgment will be held binding on class
members not present).
105. The court in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. District Court, 523 F.2d 1073
(9th Cir. 1975), recognized the availability of notice in the precertification stage, but de-
clined to authorize such notice for the purpose of bringing the claims of unnamed members
of the plaintiff class before the court. The court's refusal to authorize notice was not based
on the rationale that notice can be sent only when due process requires notice. Rather, the
court was concerned that if Rule 23 requirements were not met and certification was denied,
notice would facilitate the joinder of the unnamed members in circumvention of Rule 23. Id.
at 1079.
106. 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
107. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. District Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1082 (9th
Cir. 1975) (Schnacke, J., dissenting).
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defendant.10
The long-recognized inherent powers of the court 10 9 also pro-
vide a basis for allowing notice in the absence of due process.
Courts have the power to make reasonable rules of procedure to
regulate their proceedings to the extent that they do not conflict
with existing rules or statutes.110 To a large extent, this power has
been codified for the federal courts in Rule 42(a)111 and Rule 83.112
Rule 42(a) recognizes the power of the court to make such orders
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay in pending actions.
An order requiring notice in a section 216(b) action should fall
within the authorization of Rule 42(a). By assembling potential
parties at the earliest possible time, matters such as discovery,
depositions, and settlement offers may be handled more easily and
more efficiently.113
Rule 83114 also provides an appropriate basis for a district
court to provide notice to potential plaintiffs in a section 216(b)
action. Although the Federal Rules do not cover every possible
procedure, Rule 83 allows federal district courts to make or amend
rules as long as the new or amended rules do not conflict with the
existing Federal Rules or statutes. 5 Because section 216(b) does
not address the use of notice to potential plaintiffs, a district court
order permitting such notice would not be inconsistent with any
108. See note 99 & accompanying text supra.
109. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 631-32 (1962); Fx parte Peterson,
253 U.S. 300, 314 (1920).
110. See Franquez v. United States, 604 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1979); Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137,
141-42 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973); Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 61
F.2d 736, 737-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 740 (1932).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
112. Id. 83.
113. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. District Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.
1975) (Schnacke, J., dissenting). The majority in Pan American rejected this rationale in
denying precertification notice in a Rule 23 class action. The court stated that Rule 42(a)
only applies to consolidation of actions already pending, not those yet to be filed. Because
allowing notice to consolidate actions that are not yet fied would serve the purposes of Rule
42(a)-resolution of common questions of law or fact-this distinction seems overly techni-
cal, as the majority appears to admit. Id. at 1080-81.
114. Rule 83 provides: "Each district court by action of a majority of the judges
thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules.... In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
115. United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1979); Dickinson Supply, Inc. v.
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 423 F.2d 106, 110 (8th Cir. 1970).
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existing statute or rule.
The Federal Rules give district courts a substantial amount of
discretion in regulating the manner in which a case is conducted.
Thus, the focus of the courts should not be on whether a statute or
rule permits giving notice, but rather, whether there is any statute
or rule that forbids notice,1 6 and whether notice is appropriate in
the circumstances of a particular case.
Solicitation of Potential Plaintiffs
In addition to the controversy surrounding the issue of
whether a court may order notice to potential plaintiffs, courts will
be called upon to determine what independent action the plaintiffs
and their attorneys may take to notify and encourage others to
join a section 216(b) action. Such action, even when authorized by
a court, may constitute illegal 17 or unethical" 8 solicitation of
claims. "' This issue takes on added significance because of the
unique nature of a section 216(b) class action. If a court will not
provide notice informing potential plaintiffs of the opportunity to
"opt-in," notice from the existing plaintiffs may well be the only
way these people will ever be informed that redress is available. 20
The traditional judicial approach has been not to allow solici-
tation of potential claims in any manner.' 2 ' Courts following this
approach use the same due process rationale that forbids notifica-
tion by the court. 2 2 If due process does not require potential plain-
tiffs to be notified, plaintiffs' counsel may only solicit claims if ex-
116. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. District Court, 523 F.2d 1073, 1082 (9th_ Cir.
1975) (Schnacke, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 158 (West 1970).
118. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE § 6076 (West 1970).
119. See Montalto v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Wagner v. Loew's Theatres, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 23 (D.N.C. 1977); Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67
F.R.D. 28 (E.D. La. 1975). See also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir.
1977).
120. This argument was implicit in the Riojas court's decision to allow court-approved
notice to potential plaintiffs, see note 126 infra, and is especially important in circumstances
such as those in Riojas. See note 101 supra.
121. The court in Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. La. 1975), stated:
"There are important policy considerations of ancient vintage which militate strongly
against the giving of notice where not required by due process. The awakening of sleeping
plaintiffs by either the plaintiff or the Court would fly in the teeth of the centuries-old
doctrine against solicitation of claims." Id. at 30.
122. See notes 95-96 & accompanying text supra.
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pressly granted the right by statute.12
Recent judicial expressions on the issue of solicitation of
claims have not been as restrictive. Solicitation in a section 216(b)
action has been permitted in the form of notice independently cir-
culated by the plaintiff's counsel124 and by judicially authorized
notice identifying the plaintiff's counsel.12 5 These decisions indi-
cate that such solicitation will be permitted when the action is not
taken for the pecuniary benefit of the soliciting counsel.12 6 Similar
solicitation endeavors of the ACLU and NAACP have also been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court on constitutional
grounds. 27 The Court stated that such nonprofit activity under-
taken to provide access to the courts is a fundamental right within
the protection of the first amendment. 
1 2
The analogy to Rule 23 class actions in the precertification
stage is also helpful with regard to the issue of solicitation of
claims. In two recent cases,1 29 courts held that an order limiting
communications by parties and their counsel with actual or poten-
tial class members while certification of" the Rule 23 class is pend-
ing amounts to an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of
123. Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (E.D. La. 1975).
124. See Joyce v. Sandia Laboratories, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,043A (N.D. Cal. 1980).
125. See, e.g., Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 2188
(S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 7, 1981); Riojas v. Seal Prod., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1979);
Geller v. Markham, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 1622 (D. Conn. 1979).
126. In Riojas v. Seal Prod., Inc., 82 F.R.D. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1979), the defendants main-
tained that the consent authorization forms solicited by the Texas Rural Legal Aid
amounted to barratrous material. The court disagreed. Emphasizing that the Texas Rural
Legal Aid is a free legal assistance organization not receiving money from the plaintiffs, the
court reasoned that such an organization could not be accused of barratry when it is merely
attempting to carry out its nonprofit goals in an efficient and beneficial manner. In both
Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 2188 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 7,
1981), and Geller v. Markham, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 1622 (D. Conn. 1979), judicially authorized
notice was sent to potential plaintiffs with a proviso that, as potential class members, they
could have their own attorney take the requisite action to join the suit. The court in Joyce v.
Sandia Laboratories, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. I 31,043A (N.D. Cal. 1980) was even more liberal,
holding that even though pecuniary gain could redound to the plaintiff's private counsel, the
rule had not been settled and the court need not forbid plaintiff's counsel from giving no-
tice. The court did not require the proviso used in Frank and Geller. Id. at 16,407.
127. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
128. 436 U.S. at 426 (citing United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971)).
129. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980); Zarate v. Younglove, 86
F.R.D. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See also Colas v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 985 (1977).
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speech.i 0 The courts rejected the argument that such orders were
necessary to prevent the evils of solicitation and abuses of the
class action device. Both courts expressed the opinion that the im-
portance of solicitation to the progress of the class action out-
weighs any ethical problems 31 caused by the solicitation."3 2 This
situation is directly analogous to the difficulty raised by section
216(b). By allowing plaintiffs to solicit potential plaintiffs prior to
the formal establishment of the class, plaintiffs' first amendment
rights are protected and the purposes of the class action device are
furthered." s5
Conclusion
Although over a decade has passed since its adoption, the
ADEA still poses questions for judicial resolution and presents
other problems for reconsideration. The rationale for the failure of
the ADEA to allow Rule 23 class actions in suits against private
employers remains inexplicable. There are no factors unique to the
age discrimination prohibitions that make the Rule 23 device any
less effective or appropriate in enforcing them than the prohibi-
tions against other forms of discrimination in Title VII.1" Further,
there is not any indication that Congress intended broader avenues
of redress in suits against the federal government than against pri-
vate employers. These distinctions seem quite incongruous in light
of ADEA's remedial purposes. It is apparent that the "opt-in" re-
quirement is not promoting these purposes. Because the law is un-
ambiguous, legislative change would be the most effective method
to remedy this problem. Congress should amend section 626(b) ex-
pressly to exclude incorporation of section 216(b). Such an amend-
ment would eliminate the class action difficulty and still allow the
ADEA to be enforced with the majority of the FLSA procedures.
130. In Bernard, the court of appeals reversed a district court order prohibiting com-
munications, 619 F.2d at 477; in Zarate, the district court refused defendant's request for
such an order, 86 F.R.D. at 106.
131. The Supreme Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978),
stated some of the ethical problems: "stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent claims,
debasing the legal profession, and potential harm to the solicited client in the form of over-
reaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation." Id. at 461 (footnote
omitted).
132. 619 F.2d at 475-76; 86 F.R.D. at 95.
133. See Coles v. Marsh, 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1977).
134. See note 7 supra.
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Even if congressional action is not taken, proper judicial reso-
lution of the notice and solicitation issues can lessen the detrimen-
tal effect of barring Rule 23 class actions. In light of recent cases
deemphasizing the problem of solicitation,' 5 and in the wake of
recent decisions allowing solicitation in the analogous Rule 23 pre-
certification cases, 138 the arguments against allowing notice to po-
tential plaintiffs have been substantially weakened. By allowing
notice and not prohibiting solicitation, the effectiveness of the
ADEA, even while using the section 216(b) class action, can be
enhanced.
135. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
136. See notes 129-33 & accompanying text supra.
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